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Introduction
Questions of whether, how, and to whom phil-
anthropic foundations are accountable have been 
taken up in several ways over the past 15 years 
(Rourke, 2014). Over the same period, there has 
been increased interest in the topic of strate-
gic learning in philanthropy (Coffman & Beer, 
2011; Lynn, 2012; Reid, 2016; Kennedy Leahy, 
Wegmann, & Nolen, 2016). Amid these devel-
opments, a few authors have examined the rela-
tionship between accountability and learning, 
arguing that these practices, while often per-
ceived as conflicting, are in fact complementary 
and mutually reinforcing (Guijt, 2010; Preskill, 
Parkhurst, & Juster, 2014). In this article, we build 
on these arguments and explore what it looks 
like in practice when a foundation attempts to 
integrate accountability and learning practices.1
In theory, as Irene Guijt (2010) writes, account-
ability and learning are mutually reinforcing: 
“They need each other. Understanding effec-
tiveness requires both” (p. 277). Unfortunately, 
as she continues, “that is the theory. The daily 
reality is that tensions between the two are alive 
and kicking” (p. 277). Drawing on our experi-
ence in the strategy, learning, and evaluation 
department at the Walton Family Foundation 
(WFF), we offer some promising practices that 
can help manage the tensions between learning 
and accountability and help address the common 
misperception that accountability is a barrier to 
learning. We argue that the belief that learning 
and accountability are somehow oppositional 
Key Points
 • This article explores what it looks like 
when a foundation attempts to integrate 
accountability and learning practices, and 
presents a framework for the unique and 
complementary contributions that account-
ability and learning can make to the work of 
foundations. 
 • The article also looks at the tensions that 
can arise when a foundation’s internal eval-
uation staff attempt to design, implement, 
and make use of accountability systems. 
Specifically, it identifies three problematic 
perspectives that can hold foundations back 
from full engagement in internally driven 
accountability initiatives, and offers practical 
guidance on how to shift these mindsets to 
more productive practices. 
 • It concludes by calling on evaluation and 
program staff, foundation leaders, and 
board members to address the structural, 
cultural, and mental barriers to constructive 
accountability systems in philanthropy. 
In doing so, the authors hope to prompt 
reflection and action that will strengthen 
foundation practice and support greater 
philanthropic impact.
not only heightens tension between program 
staff and internal evaluators, but it can also 
undermine a shared goal among all people work-
ing in philanthropy — namely, to continuously 
1 We acknowledge that the tension between accountability and learning plays out as much, if not more, within the context of 
the grantee and foundation dynamic. For the purposes of this article, however, we focus on the particular dynamics at play 
within a foundation’s walls.
doi: 10.9707/1944-5660.1455
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improve our work in order to impact the large-
scale problems we seek to address.
To situate the particular type of accountability 
we aim to explore, we begin with a brief review 
of the conversation about philanthropic account-
ability writ large. We then present a framework 
that illustrates the unique and complementary 
contributions that accountability and learning 
can make to the work of foundations. Finally, 
we explore the tensions that can arise when a 
foundation’s internal evaluation staff attempts 
to design, implement, and make use of account-
ability systems. Specifically, we identify three 
problematic perspectives that can sometimes 
hold foundations back from full engagement 
in internally driven accountability initiatives, 
and we offer practical guidance on how to shift 
these mindsets to more productive practices. We 
conclude by calling on evaluation and program 
staff, foundation leaders, and board members to 
take steps to address the structural, cultural, and 
mental barriers to constructive accountability 
systems in philanthropy. In doing so, we hope to 
prompt reflection and action that will strengthen 
foundation practice and support greater philan-
thropic impact.
Setting the Context: Accountability 
in Philanthropy
In the broadest sense, there has been a question 
about whether private foundations are suffi-
ciently accountable in a democratic society. In a 
number of publications, Rob Reich (2016, 2013) 
and others (e.g., Rourke, 2014) have discussed 
how foundations are immune from both mar-
ket-based accountability (in the form of consum-
ers being able to choose alternative providers of 
goods and services) and political accountability 
(in terms of answerability through elections). At 
the same time, others (e.g., Kramer, 2013) have 
pointed out that foundations do face some pub-
lic pressure to perform or else face reputational 
risks that can ultimately undermine their effec-
tiveness. Notwithstanding this qualification or 
the feelings of some foundation staff (Gates & 
Rourke, 2014), there is little current dispute that 
foundations are largely unaccountable — in the 
traditional sense — for generating results.
In the absence of traditional, externally imposed 
accountability structures, some have argued that 
the philanthropic sector should take efforts to 
regulate itself. As Rick Cohen (2005) explained, 
there are different ways that foundations can par-
ticipate in self-regulation, including subjecting 
themselves to ratings and evaluations or joining 
trade associations that have codes of practice. 
Cohen acknowledged that these sector-level 
approaches suffer from at least two inherent 
weaknesses: participation in them is voluntary, 
and they lack a strong enforcement mechanism. 
The organization Cohen once led, the National 
Committee for Responsive Philanthropy, has 
tried to address some of these challenges as a sec-
tor watchdog (e.g., by instituting its Philamplify 
series). Despite these efforts, it is fair to say that 
accountability largely remains an internal, elec-
tive practice for most foundations.
Foundations’ elective practices include a range 
of initiatives implemented at the foundation, 
program, and grant levels. For example, more 
than 95 foundations are participating in the 
Foundation Center’s GlassPockets project (n.d.), 
which aims “to increase understanding of 
best practices in foundation transparency and 
accountability in an online world” by publish-
ing descriptive information about foundation 
structure and processes across 26 indicators (para 
2). Many foundations have also taken steps to 
increase their accountability to grantees. For 
example, there are now 320 foundations of all 
sizes and missions participating in the Center 
for Effective Philanthropy’s Grantee Perception 
Report, an instrument that allows grantees to 
provide anonymous feedback to foundations 
across a range of topics, from perceptions of 
approachability to impact.
While these are important steps in the right 
direction, perhaps the most meaningful self-im-
posed efforts to promote accountability, partic-
ularly among larger foundations, have come as 
part of investments in internally driven monitor-
ing and evaluation. In their most recent survey of 
evaluation practice among independent and com-
munity foundations giving at least $10 million 
annually, the Center for Effective Philanthropy 
(CEP) and the Center for Evaluation Innovation 
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(CEI) (2016) found that about half of responding 
foundations had at least 1.5 full-time-equiva-
lent positions dedicated to evaluation work and 
that about a quarter of foundations reported 
spending at least $1 million annually on evalua-
tion. In total, 71 percent of survey respondents 
(including those working at foundations without 
dedicated evaluation staff) reported spending 
time “compiling and/or monitoring metrics to 
measure foundation performance” (CEP & CEI, 
p. 20). Interestingly, more than half of survey 
respondents believed they spent too little time 
on these activities.
Internal evaluation staff are not solely focused 
on accountability, though: More than 70 percent 
of evaluation staff also report spending time 
designing and/or facilitating learning activities.2 
For purposes of this article, we are most inter-
ested in the time that evaluation staff invests in 
strategic learning, defined as “the use of data and 
insights from a variety of information-gathering 
approaches — including monitoring and evalu-
ation — to inform decision-making about strat-
egy” (Coffman & Beer, 2011, p.1). In other words, 
whereas accountability systems are oriented 
retrospectively to assess progress against prede-
termined objectives, strategic learning is oriented 
prospectively, toward shaping future decisions 
and actions. It is also worth noting that account-
ability systems are almost always narrowly 
focused on tracking progress toward intended 
outcomes or impact goals, whereas learning 
activities can cover a much broader range of 
topics and questions. As a practice, learning is an 
active process that can take many forms; it can be 
done individually, in groups, through facilitated 
activities, or in quiet reflection; for example, 
FSG’s recent toolkit, Facilitating Intentional Group 
Learning (Preskill, Gutierrez, & Mack, 2016), 
describes 21 activities through which organiza-
tions can structure shared learning experiences.
The differences between accountability and 
learning in terms of purpose and use should in 
theory make them complementary practices. 
We explore this argument when we present a 
framework for how foundations can integrate 
learning and accountability to help strengthen 
philanthropic practice, and offer an example 
of how this has worked at the WFF. The chal-
lenge is that the reality of implementing robust 
accountability and learning practices within 
foundations often creates tension. We also iden-
tify some of the common mindsets that can limit 
program staff support for accountability prac-
tices, and offer some guidance on how founda-
tions can overcome these challenges.
The Case for Synergy Between 
Accountability and Learning
Guijt begins her seminal 2010 article by stating, 
“You cannot be accountable if you do not learn. 
And you need to know how well you live up to 
performance expectations in order to learn. The 
tug-of-war between learning and accountability 
is nonsensical” (p. 277). We completely agree.
To take a fairly simple example, it is hard to 
imagine how a program officer could learn to 
improve the effectiveness of her work on health 
disparities without credible information about 
how her work to date has (or has not) influenced 
those disparities — in other words, she needs to 
know how well her work measures up to expec-
tations. In this way, accountability serves as an 
engine that helps power the learning process. At 
the same time, by actively learning and making 
changes to her approach — including, perhaps, 
working with different grantees or funding dif-
ferent approaches — the same program officer 
can improve the effectiveness of her work and, in 
so doing, become more accountable to the foun-
dation and the field.
Knowing how best to balance learning and 
accountability is certainly more of an art than a 
science. As Guijt suggests, “being clear about the 
nature of the context in which one is operating 
can help [funders] understand what is needed 
and what is feasible in connecting accountability 
and learning” (p. 286). In particular, foundations 
should expect that these practices will look dif-
ferent when applied to fairly straightforward 
2 Other types of learning activities can include developing and delivering skill-building trainings or facilitated learning-
exchange opportunities (e.g., "lunch and learns"). 
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A framework for understanding the complementary roles of learning and accountability
Simpler Problems
We can hold grantees accountable for: 
 Execution: Doing what they say they would
 Quality: Doing the work well
 Results/Impact: Achieving intended outcomes 
We can hold ourselves accountable for: 
 Achieving intended outcomes
 Choosing great grantees
 Providing sufficient resources to support high-quality work 
 Setting ambitious but realistic expectations for progress
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We can hold grantees accountable for: 
 Adaptation: Responding effectively to changes in context
 Quality: Doing the work well
 Results/Impact: Making meaningful progress toward 
     intended outcomes 
We can hold ourselves accountable for: 
 Making meaningful progress toward intended outcomes
 Providing flexibility to support necessary course corrections
 Providing sufficient resources to support high-quality work 
 Setting ambitious but realistic expectations for progress
Together with our grantees and partners, we can learn 
about:
 Context: The conditions that facilitate success and how we    
     can strengthen them; the conditions that create challenges or 
     barriers and how we might address them
 Changes in the system: Whom the program is (and is not) 
     working for, and why
 Consequences: Any unintended consequences of our work 
     and how we might mitigate these 
Together with our grantees and partners, we can learn 
about:
 Context: How our work intersects with that of other funders,    
     and how we might improve alignment and/or coordination
 Changes in the system: How different elements in the  
     system are reacting to our work and how we might address 
     these responses
 Consequences: Any unintended consequences of our work  
     and how we might mitigate these 
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More Complex Problems
interventions (e.g., meal-delivery services) as 
compared to more complex systems-change 
efforts (e.g., improving access to fresh foods). In 
our framework for learning and accountability, 
we illustrate how foundations can use account-
ability and learning to improve their work, 
whether it is a relatively simple program imple-
mentation or a more complex, systems-change 
effort. (See Figure 1.)
As the framework illustrates, there are several 
ways in which both foundations and their grant-
ees can be held accountable for their efforts to 
advance a particular goal. While there is some 
overlap between these practices under simpler 
and more complex conditions, there are also 
some important differences. Specifically, when 
funding grantees working in complex environ-
ments, foundations should not aim to hold grant-
ees accountable for precise execution of an overly 
detailed plan amid changes in context. Rather, 
foundations should be looking at how effectively 
grantees (and foundation staff) respond to those 
changes as they pursue the intended objectives of 
a given grant or initiative.
The framework also illustrates the symbiotic 
nature of the two practices: the same data that 
feed the accountability structure (e.g., on grantee 
execution or foundation responsiveness or flexi-
bility) also provide fuel for robust learning activi-
ties. To complete the cycle, the results of learning 
activities (e.g., insights about success factors, 
system dynamics, or unintended consequences) 
can help shape future approaches to accountabil-
ity (e.g., performance expectations).3
It is important to note that the data used to sup-
port learning and accountability can come from 
a variety of evaluative approaches. The key to 
FIGURE 1  A Framework for Understanding the Complementary Roles of Learning and Accountability
3 Guijt further expands on the dynamics of learning and accountability under conditions of complexity, describing this as the 
“domain where accountability and learning depend on each other. Accountability is demonstrated by showing how learning 
has led to adaptation or response-ability" (p. 287). 
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determining the most appropriate evaluation 
approach is to identify the type and maturity 
of philanthropic strategy or investment being 
assessed. Again, the complexity spectrum and 
the framework can be instructive. (See Figure 
1.) For example, as a part of its city-level work 
to improve education and life outcomes for 
young people, in 2017 the WFF’s K–12 Education 
Program funded 35 community and parent orga-
nizing grants totaling over $15.9 million. This 
strategy is newer for the foundation, and the 
very nature of the work of community organi-
zations is often emergent and responsive. While 
the K–12 Education Program has an overarching 
strategy for this grant portfolio and each grant 
has clear objectives, the work often unfolds in 
less predictable ways. As such, for this type of 
more complex work the foundation commis-
sioned a third-party developmental evaluation. 
In partnering with the program team to scope 
the evaluation, our internal strategy, learning, 
and evaluation team (of which we are a part) 
sought to match the evaluation methods to the 
nature of the work. By contrast, when we eval-
uate the effectiveness of simpler, more discrete 
investments related, for example, to starting 
new autonomous schools (e.g. district innovation 
schools, independent public charter schools), we 
use different methods and data sources, such as 
quasi-experimental designs that compare funded 
versus nonfunded schools on the value-added 
academic growth of their respective student 
bodies. While we are aiming to expand the ways 
we measure school quality in the coming years 
as new types of measures become available, the 
nature of this school-funding strategy is more 
straightforward and something that the K–12 
Education Program officers and our partners 
often have much more experience in doing. It is 
for these reasons that a relatively more straight-
forward, even if technically complicated, impact 
evaluation makes sense.
Evaluation in service of learning and account-
ability occurs at multiple levels across the foun-
dation. In one example, the foundation worked 
to balance learning and accountability in the 
context of a midstrategy review of its Home 
Region Program, which contains both simpler 
and more complex bodies of work. (See Table 1.) 
This example aims to illustrate how these con-
cepts apply at a level above individual grants or 
even clusters of grants.
Our foundation’s grantmaking has benefited 
significantly from the combination of account-
ability and learning activities that we engaged 
in through the Home Region Program strategic 
review. We acknowledge, though, that the expe-
rience for an individual program officer or pro-
gram director of being held accountable for her 
or his work is quite different from the experience 
of a board member or a senior leader holding 
someone accountable. The power differential 
that is intrinsic to the practice of accountability 
can elicit a range of emotional responses — fear, 
stress, resentment — from those on the receiv-
ing end of an accountability discussion that can 
have real implications for their ability or willing-
ness to learn (Wigert & Harter, 2017; McDonald, 
2018). Matthew Carr, evaluation director at the 
Kauffman Foundation, (personal communica-
tion) describes the situation this way:
Evaluation will always carry the connotation of 
accountability, no matter how much emphasis is 
placed on learning or similar lenses for interpreting 
and using evidence. Successfully building a culture 
of learning and reflection requires confronting this 
fact explicitly and continuously reinforcing the 
message through words and actions that the pri-
mary purpose of measurement is to ground reflec-
tion and drive continuous improvement.
These reflections raise an important question: 
What steps can a foundation take to mitigate 
the challenges associated with accountability in 
order to support an appropriate balance between 
learning and accountability? We next identify 
three promising practices that can help evalu-
ation staff be better partners on accountability 
and learning; then we discuss some of the prob-
lematic perspectives that can hold staff back from 
full engagement in foundation-led accountability 
and learning initiatives and offer practical guid-
ance on how to shift these mindsets.
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Common Mindsets and Necessary 
Shifts in Understanding and Approach
The first step in better balancing a foundation’s 
learning and accountability practices is iden-
tifying the forces and factors that are pushing 
against accountability. As noted earlier, one of 
these factors is the “power over” dynamic that is 
inherent in accountability systems — few peo-
ple enjoy having their work evaluated by others. 
That said, the “power over” dynamic is ubiqui-
tous in the workplace, so there must be other 
forces and factors at play. We posit that there are 
actually some significant structural, cultural, and 
mental barriers in place for many foundations.
TABLE 1  Learning and Accountability in Action at the Walton Family Foundation
The Home Region Program’s most recent strategic plan, approved in April 2014, includes several 
strategies that support the program’s two core initiatives: one focused on quality of life in northwest 
Arkansas, the other focused on quality of life in two counties in the Arkansas and Mississippi Delta. 
Initiative
Northwest Arkansas 
Attract and retain top talent at all 
levels and ensure the long-term 
viability of the region.
Delta Region
Address pre-K–12 educational improvement 
in the broader region while addressing other 
key basic needs in targeted counties in order 
to establish a base on which future economic 
development can occur.
Strategies
1A.   Create world-class pre-K–12 
school options. 
1B.   Establish the region as a leader 
in arts and cultural amenities.
1C.   Strengthen coordinated regional 
economic development.
1D.   Preserve a sense of place.
2A.   Support pre-K–12 educational improvement.
2B.   Improve public safety.
2C.   Engage and develop youth.
2D.   Invest in targeted job creation.
Each strategy has a set of associated performance measures and five-year targets. For example, among 
the performance measures for Strategy 1D (“preserve a sense of place in northwest Arkansas”) are:
• 53 new miles of multi-use trails constructed with WFF funding
• 1,500 cumulative acres of public green space preserved with WFF funding 
• 4.0% of population using active transportation (walking, biking) to commute to work as measured by 
the American Community Survey (versus 2.6% at baseline)
Among the performance measures for Strategy 2A (“support pre-K–12 educational improvement in the 
Delta”):
• 580 Teach for America (TFA) corps members in the Delta (versus 529 at baseline)
• 9 independent public charter schools with 2,000 total students enrolled (versus 6 schools with 1,404 
students at baseline) 
In 2017 — about three years into the current strategic plan — the program underwent a midstrategy re-
view to enable the board and senior leadership to (1) hold the program accountable for progress toward 
the goals set forth in the plan, and (2) engage in deep learning and reflection about how to approach the 
remaining two years of the program’s strategic plan. The midstrategy review drew on a range of data 
sources (e.g., strategy level-metrics, grant evaluations, third-party research studies, conversations with 
grantees and other stakeholders). On the next page, we outline some of the findings from the midcourse 
review related to strategies 1D and 2A, and we describe how the foundation used these findings to drive 
improvements in program strategy and implementation. 
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On Strategy 1D, the midstrategy review found: 
• Need to revise targets: The program had already achieved its goals in terms of new miles of natural 
surface trails constructed and acres of high-priority open space preserved. As a result, the program 
agreed to set more ambitious performance targets. 
• Evidence of progress: The program was on track to achieve its goal of seeing 4% of the population 
using active transportation to commute to work. As a result, the program agreed to stay its course in 
terms of strategy implementation. 
• Unintended consequences: The midstrategy review observed that the program’s successes in 
terms of expanding trails and investing in arts and culture may have contributed to a shift in the local 
housing market, which is affecting working families living in the downtown area and the region’s 
ability to attract artists. As a result, the program is exploring opportunities to support local partners 
working at the intersection of housing and arts and culture. Additionally, the program continues to 
monitor the state of housing affordability in and around regional downtowns and will be considering 
this issue in its next strategic planning process. 
On Strategy 2A, the midstrategy review found:
• Evidence of progress: The program was on track to achieve its goal of seeing 2,000 students 
enrolled in charter schools. As a result, the program agreed to stay its course in terms of strategy 
implementation.
• Changes in the system: There was a significant shift in the K–12 ecosystem that held important 
implications for Strategy 2A. Due to changes in the economy and at the organization, TFA adjusted 
its approach to recruiting and placing teachers, resulting in a significant decrease in the size of 
the TFA corps in the Delta. As a result, while the program continues to partner closely with TFA, the 
foundation also decided to work both to better understand the drivers of the teacher shortages in the 
region (e.g., by commissioning a third-party qualitative research study) and to explore ways to build 
new alternative teacher pipelines to support schools in the Arkansas and Mississippi Delta. 
• Context and resources: Finally, the strategic review prompted observations that there are opportu-
nities to participate in more coordinated institutional philanthropy efforts in the region in a way that 
may address capacity challenges across the nonprofit and public sectors. As a result, the program 
decided to host a “Delta Summit” as a way of attracting new funders and strengthening connections 
among existing funders in the region. 
TABLE 1  Learning and Accountability in Action at the Walton Family Foundation (continued)
To begin with, the functional and often opera-
tional division between evaluation and program 
staff can lead to an unhelpful, “us versus them” 
dynamic in some foundations. Evaluation staff 
have a responsibility to help mitigate this chal-
lenge by being good partners to program staff 
on accountability and learning. We have iden-
tified three promising practices for evaluation 
staff to consider:
1. Respect the program officer role;
2. Seek to advise, not to prescribe; and
3. Practice self-awareness and humility.
On the program side, we believe that a number 
of misperceptions and unchallenged mindsets 
about accountability can undermine a founda-
tion’s efforts to create accountability and link it 
to learning. The relative prominence and inten-
sity of each of these mindsets varies by insti-
tution, of course, based on each foundation’s 
context. In general, though, these mindsets 
include the following:
• Accountability is unfair — the belief that 
foundations should not hold grantees or 
themselves accountable for specific results 
when they are tackling tough problems in 
an unpredictable world;
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• Accountability is incompatible with learning 
— the belief that accountability systems 
inhibit staff (or grantees) from learning; and
• Accountability information is irrelevant — 
the belief that information about past per-
formance is less valuable or important than 
deep expertise in a given issue area.
These mindsets play out in various ways; our 
goal is to identify these attitudes, consider them 
with reference to contemporary research and 
how the field has engaged with them, and offer 
solutions. Ultimately, all members of the founda-
tion team — program and evaluation staff, foun-
dation leadership, board members, and internal 
evaluators themselves — share the responsibility 
for creating a trusting and constructive account-
ability and learning practice.
Internal Evaluators: Being a Good Partner 
to Program Staff
When adopted by internal evaluators, the follow-
ing three practices can help create the conditions 
that support both accountability and learning 
among across the organization:
1. Respect the program officer role. Internal 
evaluation staff should begin by taking 
a collaborative approach that recognizes 
program staff as colleagues who bring 
valuable expertise to a difficult role. One 
way to promote greater understanding of 
the complexities of program work is for 
evaluation staff themselves to have the 
opportunity to make grants on occasion; 
in this way, they can better understand the 
many pressures and tradeoffs that program 
staff must confront. At the WFF, the strat-
egy, learning, and evaluation team man-
ages approximately $12 million annually in 
third-party research and evaluation grants 
and contracts.
2. Advise, don’t prescribe. Evaluation staff 
should not be responsible for setting per-
formance measures at a distance. When 
it comes to setting grant-level targets, 
grantees should generate the first draft in 
order to promote a sense of ownership and 
fairness. Program staff can collaborate on 
these measures to ensure alignment with 
foundation priorities, and evaluation staff 
can play a supportive role as technical advi-
sors. When it comes to setting strategy-level 
performance targets, program staff, founda-
tion leadership, and board members should 
in turn have an opportunity to weigh in, 
again with evaluation staff as advisors. At 
the WFF, we make it a priority to support 
program staff who are working with grant-
ees to set, measure, and report on their 
performance metrics, with the goal of build-
ing true partnerships with grantees. Data 
from the CEP survey of WFF grantees in 
2017 indicate that, for the most part, this 
process is working well. For example, 87 
percent of grantees across the sample (557 
organizations participated, or 58 percent of 
all of our grantees) stated that they either 
played the largest role or there was an equal 
balance with the foundation when setting 
grant measure targets. However, a minority 
of grantees (13 percent) said the foundation 
played too strong a role. One grantee wrote:
The staff is friendly, open, and honest. That said, 
they were not always as flexible as one might 
have hoped. We heard a lot of “yes, we under-
stand your point of view, but we prefer to do 
it our way.” When that comes from the check-
writer, it carries inordinate weight, of course.
Ultimately, all members 
of the foundation team — 
program and evaluation 
staff, foundation leadership, 
board members, and internal 
evaluators themselves — share 
the responsibility for creating 
a trusting and constructive 
accountability and learning 
practice. 
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 Creating a sense of shared ownership over 
performance measures is a difficult process 
that requires skill and experience in balanc-
ing multiple perspectives.
3. Practice self-awareness and humility. The 
same cognitive biases that affect program 
officers can interfere with evaluators’ 
objective assessment and decision-making. 
For example, as we are learning through 
our work with the Equitable Evaluation 
Initiative,4 when we fail to include multiple 
perspectives in evaluation design, analy-
sis, and reporting, we run the risk of per-
petuating some of the very inequities we 
seek to address through our philanthropic 
activities. It is important for evaluators to 
be mindful of their own vulnerabilities and 
preferences and to recognize that there 
are sometimes limits to what particular 
data can tell us. Involving program staff 
(and grantees, as appropriate) in analyz-
ing data and determining implications is 
one way to help mitigate bias on the part 
of the evaluation team. For example, WFF 
recently included several program staff and 
core grantees in a discussion of the initial 
findings from a third-party evaluation. 
Including multiple different perspectives as 
part of the sense-making process helped us 
gain a better understanding of the data and 
its implications for program strategy.
Adjusting Unhelpful Mindsets 
About Accountability
Guijt’s earlier research, as well as our experience 
in the field of philanthropy over the past decade, 
indicate there are a variety of problematic mind-
sets about accountability that, when adopted by 
evaluation and program staff, foundation lead-
ership, or board members, can undermine an 
organization’s efforts to create accountability 
and link it to learning. We identify some of these 
problematic perspectives and suggest how they 
may be shifted to more productive practices. 
Our goal is to highlight how all staff and board 
members have roles to play in using data to help 
drive impact.
Problematic perspective no. 1: Accountability is 
unfair. On one hand is the attitude that leader-
ship shouldn’t hold program staff and grantees 
accountable for planning and getting results 
because they are tackling tough problems in an 
unpredictable world. With a more productive 
mindset, however, accountability approaches can 
be designed and implemented fairly, and they can 
provide value even when a foundation is working 
on more complex issues.
At the core of any good accountability system is a 
predetermined plan and a set of expectations for 
performance against that plan. In philanthropy, 
as most readers know well, many foundations 
use tools such as logic models to describe their 
plan for a project or program. The idea is to artic-
ulate clearly how the foundation’s provision of 
resources will support grantee partners to under-
take actions that will lead to shared goals for 
change to social and environmental problems. 
Through these planning processes, foundations 
and their partners identify targets that become 
a shared definition of success to which everyone 
will hold themselves accountable.
Several critics (Kania, Kramer, & Russell, 
2014; Guijt, 2010; Coffman & Beer, 2016) have 
argued that setting a priori targets about what 
can be accomplished before funding complex 
interventions, such as systems-change efforts, 
subordinates learning to an unhelpful form of 
accountability. As Coffman and Beer write:
Accountability mechanisms that overly focus 
on the upfront quality of the plan and faithful 
4 See https://www.equitableeval.org
Internal evaluation staff should 
begin by taking a collaborative 
approach that recognizes 
program staff as colleagues 
who bring valuable expertise to 
a difficult role.
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implementation of it are not actually addressing 
the kinds of failures that get in the way of results 
for complex change initiatives. In fact, they might 
actually reduce chances for success because they 
incentivize the wrong kind of thinking and action: 
sticking to the plan instead of adapting. (2016, p. 38)
An alternative view is that regardless of the com-
plexity of the undertaking, careful planning and 
target setting are essential for responsibly invest-
ing a foundation’s limited resources — all of 
which have alternative uses. As Paul Brest (2014) 
has argued:
Granted that some problems are more challenging 
than others, it’s more useful to think of simple and 
complex problems as lying on a continuum rather 
than on two sides of a divide. Strategic planning 
and prediction are essential from one end of the 
continuum to the other, and there is no point at 
which they are replaced by complexity science. 
(para. 2)
We agree. When understood in this way, it is 
not the acts of planning and target setting them-
selves that need to change; rather, it is the way 
we design and implement our accountability 
systems.
When working under conditions of complexity, 
these systems need to allow for adaptive man-
agement. We should anticipate, for example, that 
the outcome of a gubernatorial election might 
influence our ability to make progress toward 
specific, state-level policy goals, and we should 
adjust the targets or timelines in our accountabil-
ity systems to reflect this change in context, just 
as program officers will be adjusting their activi-
ties and grant pipelines.
The type of accountability we are advocating 
for here is “strategic accountability.” Guijt (2010) 
explains that strategic accountability is about 
having the conversation about whether program 
staff and grantees made the best decisions they 
realistically could while considering shifts in 
context. Conceived in this way, as Lerner and 
Tetlock (1999) write, accountability has to do 
with “the implicit or explicit expectation that one 
may be called on to justify one’s beliefs, feelings, 
and actions to others” (p. 255).
What remains unstated is the second half of the 
accountability equation — namely, what should 
happen if the best decisions weren’t made or jus-
tifications are judged to be inadequate. Most of 
us have learned to expect consequences for poor 
performance in other aspects of our lives, but 
within foundations we often struggle to embrace 
that mentality. People are perfectly happy to see 
a corrupt politician lose his job or a restaurant 
that serves bad food go out of business, but we 
resist walking away from the hard-working but 
repeatedly failing nonprofit that is dedicated to 
a worthy cause. The faith and trust that founda-
tion boards place in their program staff and in 
turn that program staff places in their grantees 
makes sense, but foundations need to be willing 
to ask themselves and their partners tough ques-
tions when both program theory and program 
implementation repeatedly fail to achieve reason-
able results.
Problematic perspective no. 2: Accountability is 
incompatible with learning. A more productive 
mindset recognizes that accountability is a fun-
damental component of an effective learning 
system. As Guijt (2010) notes, “you need to know 
how well you live up to performance expecta-
tions in order to learn” (p. 277).
Program staff and grantees sometimes raise 
the concern that accountability is incompatible 
with learning, and, depending on the circum-
stances, this assertion can be legitimate. It has 
been shown that the brain can effectively shut 
down under acute stress and that chronic stress 
can undermine the brain’s ability to learn (Gill, 
Lerner, & Meosky, 2016; Farber, 2015). Not 
only can excessive or repeated stress from an 
[I]t is not the acts of planning 
and target setting themselves 
that need to change; rather, 
it is the way we design and 
implement our accountability 
systems. 
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ill-conceived accountability system undermine 
the learning most foundations are after, but 
overly strong, fear-based incentives are simply 
not constructive in the modern workplace.
On the other hand, research also indicates that 
some degree of accountability can actually help 
create the conditions that promote learning 
(Wigert & Harter, 2017). For example, provid-
ing settings for program staff to justify decisions 
or to explain what they have learned from past 
performance can actually incentivize true reflec-
tion. The challenge for foundations is to be inten-
tional on the front end about how accountability 
systems are designed and to be intentional on 
the back end about how, when, and with whom 
accountability conversations take place. On the 
front end, recent research from Gallup shows 
that “the effectiveness of goal setting and subse-
quent performance is largely determined by: 1) 
goal clarity and specificity, 2) appropriate goal 
difficulty, 3) involving employees in the pro-
cess, and 4) feedback and progress monitoring 
as performance occurs” (Wigert & Harter, 2017, 
p. 16). In the context of philanthropy, incorpo-
rating grantee perspectives in the process is also 
important. On the back end (i.e., facilitating 
accountability conversations) Gallup’s research 
shows that reviews should be “achievement-ori-
ented, fair and accurate, and developmental” 
(Wigert & Harter, 2017, p. 29).
Setting clear and measurable performance 
targets goes a long way toward ensuring that 
accountability conversations are perceived as fair 
and accurate. It is also helpful to create oppor-
tunities for staff to review and discuss findings 
about progress toward goals prior to any deci-
sion-making meetings. In other words, the first 
time a program officer is asked a hard question 
about a grant or strategy’s progress toward its 
previous goals should not be during the meet-
ing where leadership is making a decision about 
grant renewal or strategy refresh. Sequencing 
conversations in this way can help ensure that 
there are authentic opportunities for growth and 
development and that accountability systems are 
not perceived as punitive.
Problematic perspective no. 3: Accountability 
information is less important than expert 
judgment and staying the course in preferred 
solutions. Again, this mindset is based in an 
important reality: Program staff are in fact hired 
for their expertise, their networks and relation-
ships, and their ability to make effective stra-
tegic decisions about how to deploy resources. 
Particularly in philanthropy, which plays an 
essential role supporting innovative solutions to 
the toughest problems of our times, the people 
making investment choices need authority that 
matches with their responsibility.
Those considerations, however, are not incom-
patible with a mindset acknowledging that 
well-designed accountability systems provide 
timely and relevant information that can help 
both staff and grantees understand and improve 
their work. And at the same time, the very things 
that are often key to success (e.g., expert judg-
ment, strong relationships) can become liabili-
ties. As Beer and Coffman (2014) have explained, 
foundation staff can reasonably fall prey to cog-
nitive traps such as availability bias, escalation of 
commitment, and groupthink, which may lead 
to continued funding for particular grantees or 
approaches even when internal or third-party 
evaluations show that they are not effective.
To address this reality, foundation staff should 
agree to a standard for credible evidence at dif-
ferent stages of program implementation and to 
decision-making hygiene. For example, when 
reviewing relatively larger proposals to renew a 
long-term grant relationship, how and when are 
evaluation staff brought into the conversation, 
and who is present when evaluation staff are 
asked to give their opinion? The idea is that both 
Setting clear and measurable 
performance targets goes a 
long way toward ensuring that 
accountability conversations are 
perceived as fair and accurate.
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evaluation and program staff can be empowered 
to influence sound decision-making in service of 
impact.
Conclusion
Effectively integrating accountability and 
learning within a foundation requires inten-
tional effort, time, and, importantly, leadership. 
Evaluation staff can certainly do their part to 
create the right conditions for success (e.g., co-de-
signing accountability and learning systems that 
support, rather than penalize, adaptive man-
agement practices among program officers and 
grantees). But when it comes to the effective use 
of the data provided by accountability systems — 
whether in support of learning activities, strategy 
review discussions, or individual performance 
reviews — organizational leadership is essential. 
That is because accountability works only when 
the body that has the power to hold another body 
to account applies that power constructively; 
otherwise, accountability becomes a voluntary 
exercise that lacks any real effect.
As referenced earlier, most internal evaluation 
staff are expected to partner with and support 
program staff in pursuing the foundation’s 
mission and goals. As such, and with good reason, 
evaluation staff lack the authority needed to fully 
empower an organization’s accountability system 
on their own. This means that senior leaders, and 
particularly board members, have a critical role to 
play in ensuring that accountability and learning 
systems are not just well-designed and managed, 
but used effectively. For example, program staff 
and leadership need time and support to engage 
with the information they receive. Fitting in extra 
conversations to make sense of complicated and 
sometimes contradictory information can be very 
difficult amid all the responsibilities and deadlines 
that foundation staff face. If foundations want true 
engagement with the data provided by account-
ability systems, or they seek the flexibility to 
engage in true learning and adaptation, they may 
need to slow down, staff up, or change some of 
their ways of working.
We believe that the strategic and organizational 
benefits of a fully-functional, well-balanced 
accountability and learning system are well worth 
the time and effort required to implement the sys-
tem. From a strategy perspective, as illustrated by 
the Home Region Program case, access to reliable, 
well-organized data on progress toward program 
objectives provides a solid basis for thoughtful 
reflection, deep learning, and informed deci-
sion-making about course corrections. From an 
organizational perspective, accountability data 
allow us to have confidence in the value of our 
work and the impact we are having on the issues 
we care about. We can stand behind our mission 
because we have data to indicate we are serving it 
effectively, or we can change what we are doing in 
order to make greater progress.
As a sector, philanthropy has embraced the idea 
that we have a responsibility to learn and contin-
uously improve our work. If, as we argue (and as 
Guijt [2010] argued before us), we accept that learn-
ing requires accountability, then we must take 
action to overcome the structural, cultural, and 
mental barriers that stand in our way. In so doing, 
we can better position ourselves — as individual 
organizations and as a field — to have a greater 
impact on the problems we care most about.
[E]valuation staff lack the 
authority needed to fully 
empower an organization’s 
accountability system on their 
own. This means that senior 
leaders, and particularly 
board members, have a critical 
role to play in ensuring that 
accountability and learning 
systems are not just well-
designed and managed, but 
used effectively.
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